Submission: Rating Policies Review

Dr Eric Crampton
Submission
15 November, 2026

1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

1.1 This submission on Wellington City Council’s Rating Policies Review is made by The New Zealand Initiative (The Initiative), a Wellington-based think tank supported primarily by major New Zealand businesses.

1.2 The Initiative undertakes research that contributes to the development of sound public policies in New Zealand, advocating for a competitive, open, and dynamic economy and a free, prosperous, fair, and cohesive society.

1.3 The Initiative’s members span the breadth of the New Zealand economy. The views expressed in this submission are those of the author rather than the Initiative’s members. The author is a Wellington City residential ratepayer; the package recommended here would increase the share of rates paid by residential properties.

1.4 We support moving Wellington’s general rates from capital value to land value. Council should assess that change together with a substantial reduction in the commercial differential and a modest, justified uniform annual general charge per separately used or inhabited part of a rating unit (SUIP). The principled benchmark is a common general-rate multiplier of 1:1, with additional charges tied to identifiable services or benefits and, for discretionary local services and major projects, backed by a ballot of benefitted and levied properties. The Initiative’s submission on Wellington’s 2022 Draft Economic Wellbeing Strategy identified the high business differential and obstacles to housing and investment as problems Council needed to address.1

1.5 We recommend that Council:

(a) Adopt land value as the general-rate base, use a 1:1 business/residential multiplier as the principled benchmark, and pursue the greatest practicable reduction in the differential. Assess the combined package rather than preserving the existing commercial revenue share by assumption.

(b) Cost and consult on a per-SUIP annual charge for appropriate recurring services, reducing the amount recovered through the value-based general rate by the same revenue. Retain and extend user charging where practicable.

(c) Design rates around efficient service funding. Leave income redistribution to central government’s tax and transfer system, while addressing liquidity and transition separately.

(d) Phase changes where necessary and provide accessible postponement through Council’s own postponement policy and mechanisms like the proposed Ratepayer Assistance Scheme.

(e) If Council instead targets the rough proportion of rates paid by residences and businesses either during a transition period or as end-point, Council should measure that ratio separately from the contributions of regulated utilities, whose network assets have high capital value but little land value. It otherwise risks
increasing rates paid by non-utility businesses where high and uncompetitive rates on business are part of the problem to be solved. Publish the rates now assessed on Tiaki Wai and other network utilities.

(f) Use Business Improvement Districts to let business neighbourhoods choose, fund, govern and arrange delivery of additional local services, with meaningful assent to the programme and its cost.

(g) Prefer broad land-value reform to extending the vacancy differential. Support earthquake-prone-building relief where it addresses a demonstrated public benefit, and define the purpose and limits of any special-circumstances remission. Ensure land valuations reflect site-specific geotechnical and heritage constraints and their effects on development costs and feasible uses. Land encumbered by geotechnical or heritage-building issues is less valuable than comparable unencumbered land. Council should expect difficulties in obtaining clean valuations of so-encumbered land.

(h) Fund services that benefit only part of the district through user charges and targeted rates before striking the residual land-value rate. Land value apportionment is particularly appropriate in a highly urban context, like Wellington. If Wellington merges with other neighbouring councils that include substantial amounts of rural land, a much sharper focus on user-charging and realistic assessments of properties benefitted by town services will be needed. A $2 million land-value farm that uses few town services because it is too far from town should not be compelled to pay the same rates as a $2 million urban property close to services funded by rates; at the same time, downtown apartments should not cross-subsidise remote and rarely-used rural roads. The same question already arises, on a smaller scale, for rural land at Mākara and Ōhāriu.

1.6 On Council’s five key proposals: we support Key Proposal 1 (land value as the rating base); support the direction of Key Proposal 2 but recommend going further than a 3.0 multiplier; oppose Key Proposal 3 (extending the vacant-land differential); support identifying Tiaki Wai separately under Key Proposal 4, but not a continuing commercial
multiplier on its network without justification; and support the simpler earthquakeprone-building remission in Key Proposal 5, subject to the conditions in section 8.

1.7 We would welcome the opportunity to speak to this submission at the oral hearings.

1 Eric Crampton, Rates for change: How Wellington can be the blueprint for the rest of NZ, The Post Weekend, 10 June 2023; and Submission to Wellington Council on the Draft Economic Wellbeing Strategy, dated 29 April 2022, especially sections 3, 4 and 6. 2023 column; 2022 submission

Stay in the loop: Subscribe to updates